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The Theory and Practice of Taxing Difference
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Taxing Women. Edward J. McCaffery. The University of Chicago
Press, 1997. Pp vii, 310.
Edward McCaffery's important new book, Taxing Women,
explores the convergence between economic and feminist theory
in the tax context. McCaffery argues that feminist and economic
theorists who carefully consider the existing tax structure will
object to precisely the same policies and programs (although on
different grounds), and will seek identical tax reform. This is no
small claim given the longstanding tension and disagreement
that has existed between these two groups, as well as among
various individuals within each group separately. Although
McCaffery's claim might be slightly overstated, if he is correct, it
certainly suggests that the current tax laws contain serious flaws
if scrutinized under a framework either of economic efficiency or
gender fairness.
McCaffery begins the book with an exploration of a variety of
tax code provisions and tax reform proposals. He not only argues
that a number of the provisions and proposals have harmed
women, but he also uncovers compelling evidence suggesting that
tax theorists and policymakers have purposefully sought to promote a gendered division of labor that pushes men into the market and women into the home. McCaffery claims that this apt Visiting Scholar, Stanford Law School and Stanford Institute on Women and Gender; Associate Professor of Law, SUNY-Buffalo Law School. I would like to thank Guyora
Binder, Susan Cahn, and especially Beth Garrett for their help in writing this Review.
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proach to tax policymaking is so entrenched that it continues today with widespread popular and legislative support. Voicing his
dislike for this bias in a style that is both witty and poignant,
McCaffery notes that the laws are often codified with euphemistic titles such as the "Mother's and Homemaker's Rights Act,"
which he argues could more accurately be labeled the "Breadwinning Male Power Act" because it awards tax benefits to the
male breadwinner in single earner couples (p 219). Throughout
the book, McCaffery argues that Congress advances the interests
of men with stay-at-home spouses while it impedes married
women working in the waged labor force.
After McCaffery's strong argument that the tax laws are
unjust from a gender perspective, he turns to the optimal theory
of taxation. Pointing to the economic principles underlying this
theory and empirical studies that suggest that married women
are highly responsive to changes in the tax rate, he argues that
Congress could promote efficiency if it taxed married women at a
lower rate than men and single women-precisely the opposite of
what Congress has done historically. The efficiency rationale for
lowering tax rates on women is particularly powerful given
McCaffery's conclusion that just such a reform is needed if the
tax laws are to be gender neutral.'
Although McCaffery provides a detailed and nuanced analysis of the feminist and economic issues, his work is problematic
in several ways. First, it is not clear that the optimal theory of
taxation leads to the policy reform he proposes-it may be both
underinclusive and overinclusive. Second, even if McCaffery has
identified a clear economic rationale for taxing married women at
a lower rate than men and single women, feminists may object to
this proposed tax structure on a number of grounds. Finally,
McCaffery's theoretical arguments for tax reform ignore the political problems associated with implementing legal change in the
real world. As a number of political theorists have noted, legislators tend to pursue policies and programs that advance their own
interests even when it entails rejecting public-regarding policy
proposals. Despite these shortcomings, however, McCaffery's indepth and interdisciplinary analysis represents an important advance in this area of the law. Taxing Women is a book that will
be of interest to a wide range of theorists and policymakers.
This Review is organized as follows. Part I describes the argument in Taxing Women. Part II considers the possible coalition
' McCaffery argues that the "ostensibly neutral, objective, quasi-scientific economic
theory precisely agrees with the long-standing feminist critique of the tax laws" (p 169).
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that will form around McCaffery's proposed tax reform. Although
it is clear that a number of feminists and efficiency theorists will
support the proposal, universal support from both groups is impossible given the disagreements that exist between the two
groups and among the members of each individual group. Part
HI then argues that even if feminist and economist theorists
could reach consensus on a specific tax reform proposal, such a
coalition would not guarantee the proposal's implementation.
Congressional members are unlikely to pursue legislation-although efficient and fair-if such legislation interferes with the
symbolic message they seek to convey to voters.
I.

THE ARGUMENT IN TAXING WOMEN

A. Historical and Contemporary Political Struggles in the
Tax Context
McCaffery devotes a significant portion of Taxing Women to
the political struggles that have taken place around the development of the family tax rules. Parts I and II of the book investigate a predictable list of policies and provisions-including the
joint return provisions, Social Security laws, fringe benefit rules,
and the nontaxation of imputed income-all of which have been
extensively explored and criticized in the tax and feminist literature before. The book, however, does not leave the reader disappointed. McCaffery's nuanced analysis of the political and intellectual history of the code produces a number of new and important insights. Moreover, Part III of the book considers contemporary tax policy proposals, largely ignored in the literature, enabling McCaffery to demonstrate 'that his arguments addressing
gender equity and market efficiency are of more than historical
interest.
Consider McCaffery's analysis of the development of the joint
return provisions. He begins with the standard description of
Congress's decision to move from an individual to a joint filing
system, but complicates the story by highlighting the political
tradeoffs associated with the various joint reform proposals. As
McCaffery points out, the controversy around the issue initially
arose because, in 1913, Congress adopted progressive marginal
tax rates along with mandatory individual filing (pp 29-34). As a
number of tax and economic theorists pointed out, these dual
policies produced a tax burden that varied with the wife's decision to work rather than with the level of family income. For example, a couple with each spouse earning $15,000 in the waged
labor market would be subject to a lower marginal tax rate than
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a single wage earner earning $30,000 of income. This, of course,
encouraged single earner couples to establish marital agreements
and family business arrangements that divided income and property between the two spouses in order to reduce their tax burden
to the level of dual earning couples (pp 35-42). The 1913 tax code,
therefore, raised two distinct problems: it violated the principle
of horizontal fairness, which mandates that equal earning couples be taxed at equal rates, and it served as an incentive for
couples to manipulate their tax burdens through income-splitting
arrangements. Accordingly, tax theorists and policymakers began
to debate the merits of a mandatory joint filing system. As
McCaffery points out, this debate took a number of unpredictable
twists and turns-largely ignored in the literature but key to understanding the gendered nature of the code.
In moving to a joint filing system in the early 1940s, Congress had a choice between raising the level of taxation on dual
earning couples or reducing the burden on single earning couples; either option would ensure horizontal equity and eliminate
the possibility for couples to manipulate their family finances for
tax purposes. The initial 1941 reform proposal contained a rule
that required all married couples to pay taxes as if they were a
single, unmarried person (pp 49-51). This proposal, in effect, repealed the benefit obtained by couples with both spouses in the
waged labor market.
In a surprise move, conservatives and Republicans objected
to the proposal, arguing that mandatory joint filing represented
problematic social policymaking that would encroach "on the independent status and social, economic, and political individuality
of women which has been won only after a long struggle" (p 50).2
In short, the opposition maintained, joint return filing was a
"proposal out of the dark ages, [one] which would set the cause of
emancipation of women back five hundred years" (p 50).
Initially, it seems puzzling that conservative politicians
would object to legal reform because the proposed law assumed
that married couples operate as a unit rather than as two
autonomous individuals. McCaffery, however, explains the surprising phenomenon. More important, he demonstrates how politicians and theorists have used the rhetoric of women's rights
and responsibilities as a means to legitimate tax provisions that
in theory advance women's interests but, in practice, work to
maintain women's marginalized status in society.

2

Citing Randolph E. Paul, Taxation in the United States 273 (Little, Brown 1954).
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In discussing the 1941 proposal, McCaffery points out that
most married couples had a combined level of income that exempted them from taxation entirely or placed them in the lowest
tax bracket under either individual or joint filing (p 50). Accordingly, the debate over the proposed joint filing regime was of interest only to wealthy families. Moreover, because the 1941 proposal would prevent strategic income-splitting arrangements, it
would tax these families at a higher rate than under the previously existing individual filing system. In response, the high
earners, most of whom were men with stay-at-home wives (pp
50-51), sought to defeat the proposal by arguing that a joint filing
requirement would harm women's hard-won independent status.
But as McCaffery points out, these taxpayers were hardly champions of women's rights; a few years later, they supported a reform proposal with a joint filing requirement that unambiguously
harmed women's economic interests. This second proposal, which
ultimately prevailed, assumed married couples were a single
economic unit, but it also reduced the rates on single earner couples to that of the dual earner couples. Or, in McCaffery's words,
the rates were set at "equal to twice what a single person earning
half the total family income would pay" (p 54).
This rule left the tax burden on dual earner couples unchanged, but provided a benefit to single earner couples. Although the outcome initially appears to be the product of a nonzero sum game with regard to taxpayers, if the family is disaggregated it becomes clear that women suffered a significant economic setback. First, the laws eliminated the need to split income and thus discouraged men from transferring income and
property to their wives in order to reduce their own tax liability.
The joint return provisions simply allowed a reduction in the tax
burden without such a transfer, thereby denying women the legal
title to property and income once gained under the individual
filing rule. Moreover, the joint return provisions produced the
well-known "stacking effect," which essentially mandated that
secondary wage earners (or married women earning less than
their husbands in the waged labor force) pay taxes at their husbands' highest marginal tax rate.3 The joint return provisions,
Because the joint return provisions require that couples aggregate their income, the
second wage is "stacked" on top of the first wage. Such stacking in effect subjects the secondary wage earner to the highest marginal tax rate of the primary wage earner rather
than to the lower--or even zero-rate available if the spouses filed separately. See Nancy
C. Staudt, Taxing Housework, 84 Georgetown L J 1571, 1606-10 (1996) (discussing the
economic impact of joint return filing on dual earner couples). Many theorists argue that
this effect imposes costs on women because their waged work is often viewed as less important to the family and because women tend to make work decisions (including the de-
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therefore, harmed married women regardless of whether they
worked in or out of the home.4 In short, the earlier arguments
about women's rights were simply political means for defeating a
policy proposal that raised taxes on working men with stay-athome wives. Women's status as full and equal citizens was of little or no importance to those who objected to the initial joint return proposal.
The political struggle that produced the joint return provisions was not an isolated incident where congressional members
raised concerns for women's rights while simultaneously adopting policies that imposed harm. McCaffery argues that the Social
Security provisions also have a negative effect upon women.
These laws enable married women to receive retirement benefits
without ever having to work outside the home. Congress arguably adopted this policy in recognition of women's unpaid contribution to the family and the corresponding economic insecurity
that comes with unpaid labor (p 95). While the Social Security
laws clearly offer protection to married women who are economically dependent, they have a number of pitfalls that limit the
number of women who have access to such protection. In order to
obtain the benefits, for example, women must be married for ten
years or more (p 97). Today, however, the average length of marriage before divorce is seven years (p 97). Because most individuals do not anticipate a divorce at the time of marriage, women
enter marriage expecting, despite this statistic, that the law will
provide them with a certain level of economic security. Upon divorce, however, women often find themselves living in poverty at
the time they would have begun to collect Social Security income
if they had stayed married. The rules not only harm stay-athome spouses but also impose costs upon married women in the
waged labor force. Because married women will obtain the Social
cision to leave the paid labor force) based, in part, on this higher tax rate (pp 11-23). See
also Staudt, 84 Georgetown L J at 1608-10.
4 One could argue that women who did not work in the waged labor
force but who
were married to high-income wage earners benefited from the reduction in tax rates
available under the joint return provisions. This argument assumes that couples pool
their income, an assumption that must to some extent be true in light of the fact that it is
next to impossible to prevent a spouse from individually consuming certain family purchases, such as the home. See Lawrence Zelenak, Marriageand the Income Tax, 67 S Cal
L Rev 339, 351-58 (1994). A more rigorous analysis, however, would suggest that control
over purchasing decisions also is relevant to women's well-being. Such control is most
likely unavailable to the married woman who does not work in the paid labor force. See
Anne L. Alstott, Tax Policy and Feminism:Competing Goals and InstitutionalChoices, 96
Colum L Rev 2001, 2028 (1996) (noting that both control and consumption are relevant
for understanding the complex issues that arise with regard to normative questions concerning intrafamily pooling arrangements).
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Security benefits whether or not they work for a wage, there is
no marginal return on the first dollars they pay into the system
(p 95). Indeed, married women will only receive additional benefits from the Social Security taxes they pay if they have a longterm, stable, and high-paying job in the waged labor force-a
situation most women are unable to achieve. Thus, although the
Social Security laws seem to benefit women, in practice, they actually encourage women to undertake a caretaking role in the
home, a role that might harm them in the long run.5
In addition to the joint return provisions and the Social Security laws, McCaffery argues that the nontaxation of imputed
income, the fringe benefit provisions, and the state tax laws all
appear neutral on the surface but, in fact, impose significant
costs on women (pp 89-160).' In reading McCaffery's thorough
investigation of these various tax provisions, the reader is struck
by the level of historical detail the author provides. He investigates a wide range of documents largely published between 1920
and 1960, including various versions of the federal tax code, state
tax laws, legislative histories, court opinions, textbooks, and law
review articles, most of which suggest that Congress, the courts,
and commentators consciously pursued tax policies that encouraged women to work in the home, thereby imposing upon women
the costs attached to the caretaking role. At the same time, however, the reader cannot help but wonder if McCaffery simply has
identified laws and policies that are the product of antiquated social norms established in the long-gone era of "deep patriarchy."
Although McCaffery correctly points out that the provisions and
policies established decades ago provide an economic disincentive
" Because individuals who move in and out of the waged labor forces are penalized by
the Social Security system, women must devote uninterrupted time to paid labor. At the
same time, if women are to obtain at least the same level of benefits to which they are entitled as a wife, they must pay the Social Security tax attached to a high wage rate (p 95).
For the most rigorous discussion of the problems facing women in the Social Security context, see Mary E. Becker, Obscuring the Struggle: Sex Discrimination,Social Security,
and Stone, Seidman, and Tushnet's Constitutional Law, 89 Colum L Rev 264, 276-85
(1986).
By failing to tax imputed income, Congress encourages women to work in the home
rather than the market (pp 120-26). See Staudt, 84 Georgetown L J at 1590 (cited in note
3). Moreover, the failure to tax housework implies that women's caretaking responsibilities have no economic value. Finally, nontaxation denies women access to Social Security
and Medicare benefits. Id at 1596-99. The tax treatment of fringe benefits and the economic impact upon women has much the same effect as the Social Security laws (pp 12832). Indeed, McCaffery argues that even the provisions ostensibly designed to assist
women in the waged labor force offer little to no economic assistance. In particular,
McCaffery notes that the childcare provisions offer only minor assistance to most working
women and no benefits to most poor women because the credits are nonrefundable (pp
106-20).
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for women to work in the market (pp 134-35), empirical data
suggest that the laws may have little or no actual impact upon
contemporary women. For example, despite the resiliency of
these tax laws, the vast majority of women in the late twentieth
century do work in the marketplace, and these numbers continue
to rise as social mores change.7
Although he acknowledges the widespread entry of women
into the paid labor market, McCaffery nevertheless points out
that popular support for the single earner family continues to
exist today. National polls taken over the course of the last
twenty years indicate that 62 percent of Americans feel married
women should cede their jobs to men when jobs are scarce and 55
percent of those polled think it is more important for women to
advance the careers of their husbands than to have careers of
their own (pp 22, 77). Moreover, various groups, such as "Mothers at Home, Inc.," continue to lobby Congress for recognition of
women's work through economic incentives advantaging two parent, single earner families (p 119). Finally, legislators frequently
take the position that women do not want to work but are forced
into the waged labor market to help offset the costs of raising a
family (p 210).'
The Christian Coalition's Contract with the American Family
and the Republican party's Contract with America-both products of the 1990s-provide clear evidence that policies and programs advantaging stay-at-home spouses are not mere relics of a
past era but are a very real contemporary phenomenon. According to the architects of these documents:
It is hard to overestimate our tax code's damage to American
families. Many people look back to the 1950s and the 1960s
with nostalgia. At least with regard to the tax code, that
nostalgia is understandable. Those were the days when one
income was often all that was needed to support a family.
Today, many families need two incomes just to pay taxes
and meet basic needs (pp 207-08) (emphasis added).

See Beth Ann Shelton, Women, Men and Time: Gender Differences in PaidWork 35
(Greenwood 1992) (noting increased participation in the marketplace by women between
1875 and 1984).
' As McCaffery explains at p 210, Representative J. Dennis Hastert, a high-ranking
Republican, argued that "[mlothers are still forced to go into the workforce, not because
they want to but because, economically, if they want to provide for the education of their
children . .. they have no choice." Reclaiming the Tax Code for American Families,
Hearings Before the Select Committee on Children, Youth, and Families, 102d Cong, 1st
Sess 113 (1991) (statement of Representative Hastert).
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In short, the Contracts suggest that women do not want to work,
but must work in order to pay federal taxes (p 210).
Given this underlying assumption, legislators continue to
pursue policies that arguably encourage women to remain in the
home. The Contracts, for example, propose tax reform that involves a nonrefundable credit of $500 per child to each family (pp
213-15). McCaffery argues that this credit will provide a further
disincentive to women's market work because: (1) the credit is
tied to the number of children in the household rather than to
childcare expenses or other market-related activities; and (2) the
credit leaves the secondary earner distortions in place.9 With the
additional $500 available, women might feel less need for a market wage and thus nonworkers will choose to remain in the home
and secondary wage earners already in the market will be encouraged to substitute household labor for market labor (pp 21417). Indeed, the authors of the Contracts purposefully designed
the credit to have just this behavioral impact. They argue that
women are overwhelmed and overtired from working in the home
and in the market (p 208). The credit, therefore, is intended to
insert a measure of gender justice into the tax code by enabling
women to return to the home. But as McCaffery points out, this
is a rather peculiar form of gender justice and at the same time is
highly controversial.
The political documents proposing the child credit suggest
that women have both the right and the responsibility to undertake the traditional caretaking role. According to McCaffery, this
rhetoric simply promotes the long-term economic instability routinely suffered by caretakers. While his claim is accurate in some
situations, McCaffery fails to recognize that the child credit may
produce behavioral effects unpredicted by authors of the Contracts."° Because the credit is nonrefundable, it may produce just
the opposite effect on low-income women than that incurred by
high-income women. Nonrefundable credits are available only if
the family has a tax burden to offset; with no existing tax burden, the credit is useless. Accordingly, because the credit will reduce the cost of being in the market, poor nonworking women
may substitute market labor for household labor." Moreover, the
' These distortions, as noted above, are found in the joint return provisions, the Social Security laws, the fringe benefit provisions, and the decision to leave imputed income
untaxed.
" For a brief discussion of the actual child credits adopted, see Martin J. McMahon,
Jr., The New Child Credits:ExplainableMechanics and Unfathomable Policy, Tax Notes
Today Doc 97-26596 (Sept 22, 1997).
" The substitution effect experienced by nonworking women, however, will be tempered if the women incur a loss of welfare benefits.
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credit may encourage low-income women already employed in the
market to increase the number of hours they work up to the
point at which they are able to obtain the full benefit of the
credit. Once women achieve access to the full credit, however,
they will have no incentive to devote more hours to the market. 2
Indeed, at this point, working women will face an extremely high
marginal tax rate, thereby discouraging further market participation. In short, the credit is likely to encourage middle- and upper-income women to undertake the traditional caretaking role,
but may have just the opposite effect on low-income women.
This more nuanced analysis suggests that Congress might
perceive a woman's role in society as integrally linked with her
level of income and not, as McCaffery suggests, simply a function
of her sex."3 This distinction is important because it implies that
policymakers seek to circumscribe women's freedom of choice
through a variety of means and for a number of different reasons.
Middle- and upper-income women will be encouraged to work in
the home while low-income women will be pushed into the market. Any violation of these roles could result in the loss of lucrative tax benefits-a loss many women may not be willing or able
to afford.
After critiquing the proposed child credit (albeit on more
narrow grounds than I suggest), McCaffery turns to the various
flat tax proposals, all of which he argues provide a further example of contemporary policymaking that incorporates hidden biases against working married women. He notes that the proposals all contain both a high zero bracket and a joint filing feature.
Together, these provisions work to maintain (and potentially exacerbate) the secondary earner bias found in the existing tax system (pp 220-24). Due 'to the "stacking effect," 14 the proposed flat
tax will-as under today's system of increasing marginal ratestax the secondary wage earner at her husband's highest rate. If
the flat tax included an individual filing component, many
women would be free of taxes given the high personal exemptions
' Of course, because the proposal does not tie the credit to women's tax burdens, men
may experience the income and substitution effects in certain situations.
1 While McCaffery does not explore the behavioral impact of a nonrefundable child
credit on low-income women, he does note that the credit has problematic distributional
effects that favor high-income women. For example, the debate around the child credit
proposal has centered on whether Congress should phase out the benefit at high-income
levels. Under one proposal, the phase-out begins at $110,000 and the credit is fully
phased out when the family income reaches $150,000. Perversely, under this plan just 5
percent of children would receive less than the full credit because of their upper-income
status while 44 percent of children would fail to gain the benefit due to their family's lowincome level (p 215).
" See notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
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and dependency allowances incorporated into the proposals. But,
with joint filing, married women working in the waged labor
force will again suffer higher tax rates than all other taxpayers
earning a similar wage. This high tax rate, in turn, will encourage women to work in the home rather than in the market.
Moreover, low-income married women are likely to suffer a
greater burden under a flat tax than under the current progressive marginal rate system. This outcome will occur because, in
order to finance the flattening of the overall rate structure, Congress will be forced to adopt a flat tax that has a higher rate than
today's lowest marginal rate. In short, as McCaffery points out,
the flat tax proposal will benefit the primary wage earner in the
household and disadvantage women in general and low-income
women in particular.15
In discussing the increased exemption levels found in the flat
tax proposals, McCaffery points to a surprising development in
the political struggle over family taxation. He notes that a coalition of progressives and conservatives has formed around the increased personal exemption and dependency deductions similar
to those found in the flat tax. Pat Schroeder, a well-known liberal
feminist, and a number of prominent conservatives all support
legal reforms that include a large zero bracket (pp 221-23). While
conservative support for this kind of tax reform is unsurprising
(given that increased personal exemptions will lower the tax
burden on primary wage earners, who are overwhelmingly men),
McCaffery argues Schroeder's support is disturbing in light of the
fact that the proposal maintains the biases against working
women (p 223).
What Schroeder fails to recognize, according to McCaffery, is
the fact that raising the zero bracket has significant opportunity
costs. It is a tax reduction that largely benefits men and, due to
revenue concerns, eliminates competing tax reform proposals
that would work to the advantage of women. In short, McCaffery
implies that a more rational feminist position would entail supporting a proposal that called for individual filing along with a
smaller zero tax bracket. Schroeder's failure to take this alternative position demonstrates the truly hidden nature of the secondary earner bias (p 224).
Yet here again, McCaffery can be criticized for his focus on
middle- and upper-income women. Schroeder's support for the

"The lowest marginal rate is currently 15 percent. The popular flat tax proposals
suggest a rate of 17 percent and 19 percent (p 220) (examining the Armey plan and the
Hall and Rabushka proposal).
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large zero bracket feature is most likely based on the fact that it
will advantage low-income families, perhaps eliminating them
entirely from the income tax base. The plan, therefore, has potentially positive distributional effects. McCaffery's alternative
proposal (a rate structure with a narrow zero bracket and individual filing) will clearly benefit middle- and upper-income married women, but low-income women will suffer under the plan
given that they are more likely to fall within the tax base. The
point here is not that McCaffery is wrong with regard to the existence of secondary earner bias, but rather that tax reform proposals must be examined from a variety of perspectives before
any conclusion can be drawn and, more important, before they
are discarded. Many feminists, for example, would object to a
proposal that advantaged middle- and upper-income women
while disadvantaging lower-income women.
B. Inefficient Taxation as the Basis for Proposed Reform
In Part HI of Taxing Women, McCaffery turns from gender
justice to economic efficiency. He argues that the developments
in economic theory over the course of the last thirty years provide
a way out of the existing policy dilemmas and political struggles
discussed in Parts I and II of the book. Specifically, McCaffery
points to the optimal theory of taxation, 6 which prescribes tax
rules that minimize the distortion of individual decisions in the
free market.' The theory is based on the assumption that, in the
absence of taxation, the market will allocate goods in a manner
that is both efficient and fair, in the sense that the distribution
maximizes utility. 8 Under the optimal theory of taxation, Congress must set tax rates at inverse proportion to the elasticity of
the taxpayer's behavior in order to minimize the welfare loss
caused by taxation (pp 179-82)."9 Thus, inelastic behavior should
be taxed at high rates; elastic behavior should be taxed at low
rates. This concept is known in economics as the "inverse elasticity" rule.

The optimal theory of taxation grows out of the work of Frank Ramsey and James
Mirrlees. See generally F.P. Ramsey, A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation, 37 Econ J
47 (1927); J-A. Mirrlees, An Explorationin the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation, 38
Rev Econ Stud 175 (1971).
1 See Nancy C. Staudt, The Hidden Costs of the ProgressivityDebate, 50 Vand L Rev
919, 929 n 26 (1997) (exploring the surprising relationship between taxation and freemarket principles).
" See Harvey S. Rosen, Public Finance319-22 (Irwin 3d ed 1988) (discussing "excess"
burdens created by selective taxation).
See id at 322.
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Because empirical studies suggest that married women's labor supply is particularly elastic (that is, it is highly responsive
to marginal tax rates), high marginal taxation of married women
may give rise to high welfare losses (p 200). Accordingly, McCaffery proposes that Congress lower the marginal tax rate upon
married women, thereby increasing society's aggregate welfare
as well as the welfare of individual families." This result occurs
because the gain in wives' welfare attributable to the tax decrease will arguably outweigh the loss in husbands' and single
workers' welfare with the general marginal tax increase needed
to ensure revenue-neutral reform.2 ' Because optimal tax theorists
seek to maximize aggregate utility even at the expense of
women's well-being, economic and feminist theory will not always coincide. However, McCaffery points out that in this case
the policy prescription under both arguments is identical because
the tax laws have a disproportionate impact on married women's
decision to work in the waged labor force (p 200).'
McCaffery's turn to economic theory is key for two reasons.
First, he identifies a convergence between feminist and economic
thought, an intersection often left unexplored by legal scholars in
general and tax scholars in particular. Second, and perhaps more
important, McCaffery argues that economic theory is particularly
useful for devising tax reform. Implying that arguments addressing fairness and gender justice tend to reflect the interests
of the individual reformer while efficiency arguments tend to reflect the interests of society at large, McCaffery argues that economic theory provides an "external grounding... something outside the private subjective preferences of any one author, or of
any liberal, culturally elite vanguard. It thus deserves a central
position in the larger story of taxing women" (p 168).
While a number of economic theorists might agree with
McCaffery's characterization of economics as an objective framework for analyzing legal questions, his use of the optimal tax
theory ignores the value judgments that most economists recognize must be factored into tax policymaking. Moreover, it is not
at all clear that feminists will unanimously support McCaffery's
proposal to decrease the tax rates of married women. I discuss
See Alstott, 96 Colum L Rev at 2013 (cited in note 4).
id (arguing that efficiency goals might be even better served by reduced marginal rates for married women).
" See also Rosen, Public Financeat 337 (cited in note 18) (noting improved efficiency
of higher marginal taxation of husbands); Alstott, 96 Colum L Rev at 2013 (cited in note
4) (noting that the efficiency claim is consistent with the claims made by feminists on
economic grounds).
21 See
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the potential objections to McCaffery's use of the optimal tax theory in Part II below. I then turn, in Part III, to the problems associated with implementing the optimal theory of taxation in the
current political context.
II.

OBJECTIONS TO MCCAFFERY'S USE OF THE INVERSE
ELASTICITY RULE

A.

Economists' Objections

While McCaffery is correct that efficiency theorists support
the inverse elasticity rule, it is not clear that they would support
the particular reform that he advocates. McCaffery's reform calls
for a decrease in the tax burden on all married women and an increase in the tax rate on all men and single women. Econometric
studies, however, suggest that not all married women have an
elastic labor supply. Both low-income married women and married women already in the waged labor market, for example, tend
to have a relatively inelastic labor supply, perhaps due to a need
for income or simply to their desire to work.' Thus, from an efficiency standpoint, McCaffery's proposal is overinclusive: economists would not propose low tax rates on all married women; instead, economists would seek to decrease taxation only upon
middle- and upper-income married women who are not currently
working in the waged labor force.' Further, econometric studies
suggest that McCaffery's plan to decrease taxation of married
women is also underinclusive. Data indicate, for example, that
elderly individuals, male and female, are highly responsive to
changes in the wage rates.' An efficiency theorist, therefore,
would suggest that the low tax rate be applied not only to relatively wealthy, nonworking married women but also to elderly
individuals. In short, pure efficiency-oriented theorists might reject McCaffery's proposal in light of the potential welfare losses
associated with taxing elastic behavior at high marginal rates
and missing revenue opportunities by taxing inelastic behavior at
low rates.

"See James J. Heckman, What Has Been Learned About Labor Supply in the Past
Twenty Years?, 83 Am Econ Rev Papers & Proceedings 116, 118 (May 1993) (noting the
similarities in "hours worked" elasticity between men and women participating in the labor force).
See, for example, Rosen, Public Finance at 337 n 8 (cited in note 18) (emphasizing
that elasticity, not gender, is the crucial consideration in optimal tax theory).
See Joseph Bankman and Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure:
A New Look at ProgressiveTaxation, 75 Cal L Rev 1905, 1927 (1987) (discussing possible
reasons for high elasticity observed among the elderly).
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McCaffery might acknowledge these pitfalls but nevertheless
argue that efficiency theorists will support his proposal. First,
the proposal may be far more efficient than the existing tax regime given that the current laws fail to account for any differential in men's and women's labor supply curves. Second, a more
nuanced reform proposal that accounts for the various econometric studies might be rejected on grounds of simplicity. It is widely
understood that elaborate legal distinctions create inefficient
complexities that, in turn, impose welfare losses upon society.
Thus, the underinclusive and overinclusive nature of McCaffery's
proposal may be precisely the reason that efficiency-oriented
economists support it.
Although McCaffery's proposal may be defensible from a
pure efficiency standpoint, it is also important to recognize that
most economists are not concerned solely with efficiency. Guided
also by fairness concerns, economists have rejected various forms
of simple and efficient taxation. For example, the lump sum tax
is least likely to produce behavioral distortions and welfare
losses and thus should be supported by efficiency-oriented theorists." Yet, given the extremely regressive impact of a lump sum
tax, market-based theorists and policymakers have widely rejected it as a policy option and have turned instead to a system
based on income and consumption." McCaffery's application of
the inverse elasticity rule would raise fairness problems similar
to those encountered with the lump sum tax. The inverse elasticity rule, for example, prescribes high taxes for price inelastic
goods such as food and water as well as life saving drugs such as
insulin (p 192).' It would also require imposing high tax burdens
on the waged labor of low-income women-one of the most economically vulnerable groups in society, which also happens to
have an inelastic labor supply curve. Borrowing the insights of
the optimal theory of taxation, therefore, does not eliminate the
fairness concerns that McCaffery suggests are so intertwined
with private subject preferences. Indeed, as economists routinely
note, there are many controversial value judgments that must be
addressed if Congress is successfully to implement the optimal
tax system.2
McCaffery recognizes this problem and readily acknowledges
that Congress should not adhere to efficient taxation in all cir2

1988).

See Rosen, PublicFinance at 306-10 (cited in note 18).
See id at 310.
See id at 335-36.
See id at 346; Joseph E. Stiglitz, Economics of the Public Sector 481 (Norton 2d ed
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cumstances. Indeed, he implies that low-income women should
not suffer the high tax burdens that he proposes Congress levy
upon men and single women (p 194). Yet once McCaffery is willing to make such an exception to the inverse elasticity rule, he
must identify a principle that dictates when Congress must adhere to the rule and when Congress is free to ignore it. But once
he identifies such a principle, he will inevitably lose the support
of various economic theorists, many of whom will have a completely different view on the fairness/efficiency tradeoff.
Moreover, acknowledging the importance of fairness challenges McCaffery's earlier claim that optimal tax theory provides
neutral principles upon which to base tax reform (p 168). It suggests that here, as elsewhere, there are no objective principles
that will garner universal support. Not only are neutral principles impossible to identify, but the inclination to hide tax politics
behind a facade of neutrality may do voters a disservice. This approach to policymaking implies that there are no difficult decisions or tradeoffs and thus denies voters an opportunity to engage in useful debate on the issues at hand.
Although McCaffery fails to investigate the difficult issues
that arise in the fairness debates, traditionally tax theorists and
policymakers have considered an individual's "ability to pay" as
the appropriate standard for determining fair tax rates. If
McCaffery accepts this standard, he must allow for relatively low
tax rates on all low-income taxpayers-married, single, male,
and female. If all these groups are entitled to low rates for fairness reasons and married women are entitled to low rates for efficiency reasons, then Congress is left taxing middle- and upperincome men and middle- and upper-income single women at the
highest marginal tax rates. The scheme begins to look identical
to the existing progressive marginal tax rate structure with a
special exemption for middle- and high-income married womenan outcome that progressivity theorists will find objectionable."0
Of course, progressivity theorists might support McCaffery's
proposal ifit were better tailored to account for the ability-to-pay
norm. For example, Congress could lower the rates on all mar' Because the ability-to-pay norm is based on the underlying assumption that income
has decreasing marginal utility, the norm suggests no rationale for providing a special
exemption for middle- and upper-income married women. Indeed, because these taxpayers are frequently married to high-income men, McCaffery's proposal is particularly perverse given the likelihood that the family will pool income to some extent. Accordingly,
feminist theorists are more likely to take the position that Congress should further reduce the tax rates on low-income women at the cost of raising the rates on middle- and
high-income women, despite the efficiency rationale for decreasing the tax rate on this
latter group.
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ried women, including middle- and upper-income married
women, and at the same time raise the rates on middle- and upper-income married men, but not on low-income married men or
single men and women. This scheme would enable all married
women to have the advantage of low marginal rates that would
satisfy McCaffery's efficiency concerns while at the same time
requiring their husbands to pay the cost of the reform. In short,
this alternative proposal would ensure that high-income families
pay high tax burdens without unfairly penalizing all workers
with inelastic labor supplies.
More problems will develop, however, once McCaffery's proposal is reconstructed to account for realistic assumptions regarding a taxpayer's ability to pay. Economists, for example, do
not universally accept one of the central underlying premises of
progressive taxation-the belief that money has a decreasing
marginal utility of income. 1 Those who do not accept this description of the value of money are not likely to accept a tax rate
structure that assigns low tax rates to low-income men and
women who have inelastic labor supply curves. 2 Economists who
do accept this premise will nevertheless debate the difficult questions associated with the design of the rate structure, a problem
that necessarily calls for value judgments. A utilitarian, for example, will advocate a system that looks very different from that
advocated by a Rawlsian.3 The point is that tax reform based on
efficiency theory does not eliminate controversy and debate
among economists. Optimal taxation may provide a useful starting point, but it does not solve the puzzle of devising a fair and
efficient tax policy. Indeed, some economists argue that the optimal system of taxation is an ideal that cannot be achieved in
practice because of the difficulty of discovering the elasticity
curves along with the danger of basing taxation on erroneous
data.3

Rosen, Public Finance at 164 (cited in note 18) (suggesting that marginal utility of
income may be constant at all levels). See also Staudt, 50 Vand L Rev at 942-43 (cited in
note 17) (noting that economists have questioned the validity of this assumption given
the difficulty of interpersonal comparisons).
"See Rosen, PublicFinance at 164 (cited in note 18) (noting that redistribution policies will not improve social welfare unless decreasing marginal utility of income theory
holds).
"See Bankman and Griffith, 75 Cal L Rev at 1959-60 (cited in note 25) (noting the
potential differences in an income tax scheme devised by a utilitarian and a Rawlsian).
For a discussion of various political theories, including utilitarianism and Rawlsianism,
see Staudt, 50 Vand L Rev at 933-57 (cited in note 17).
See, for example, Richard A. Musgrave and Peggy B. Musgrave, Public Finance in
Theory and Practice293 (McGraw-Hill 1989).
1
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B. Feminists' Objections
In writing Taxing Women, McCaffery provides the first indepth exploration of differential tax rates as a means for promoting women's market equality. The advantages of the proposal, from a feminist perspective, revolve around the fact that it
recognizes important differences in men's and women's labor
supplies. Yet it is precisely this feature of the proposal that will
lead feminists to object to it. Moreover, as I discuss in the next
Part, this feature is likely to limit, if not eliminate, any potential
for agreement between economic and feminist theorists on policy
outcomes.
Feminists who advocate equal treatment of men and women,
for example, will object to any legislative policy that imposes differential treatment on men and women under the theory that sex
bears no relationship to one's ability to perform or to contribute
to society. 5 These feminists argue that men and women are substantially similar and thus are entitled to similar treatment under the law. Indeed, preferential treatment is not only unnecessary, but it may even solidify and exaggerate the significance of
the biological differences that have historically been central to
the oppression of women. 5 As tax theorists have pointed out,
formal equality theorists are likely to object to McCaffery's proposal."
Of course, McCaffery might argue that optimal tax theory
also mandates equal treatment of women and men, in the sense
that both would be subject to tax burdens that impose similar
welfare losses. Indeed, McCaffery proposes that Congress use
sex-neutral language in devising the differential tax burdens on
men and women. Yet, as McCaffery acknowledges, even if Congress imposes a lower tax on the "secondary wage-earners"
rather than on married women in particular, it is clear that
women and not men will reap the benefits of the lower tax (p 21).
Moreover, theorists attempting to disguise differential treatment
of men and women miss the strategy underlying formal equality.
As a strategic matter, formal equality feminists object to differential treatment of any kind between men and women on the
theory that it works to sanction discriminatory treatment that
ultimately harms women. Preferential treatment has a poten"See, for example, Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U Pa L
Rev 955, 963-69 (1984) (discussing "assimilationist" views of sex equality).
"See id at 1007-13. See also Kathryn Abrams, Title VII and the Complex Female
Subject, 92 Mich L Rev 2479, 2480 (1994) (distinguishing "sameness feminism" from "difference feminism").
"See Alstott, 96 Colum L Rev at 2034 (cited in note 4).
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tially negative symbolic impact on women because it suggests
that women are incapable of achieving success without assistance-a view that perpetuates the notion that women are fragile, incompetent, and powerless, thereby needing the protection
of men and the state. Constraining the hand of the state and
eliminating all possible violations of this precept (which is strikingly similar to the principle of horizontal fairness) arguably
serve women far better over time. In short, formal equality theorists would object to McCaffery's proposal because it calls for
lower tax rates on married women than on men and single
women, preferential treatment that can only impose harm in the
long run.'
Formal equality feminism is, of course, not universally accepted. A number of feminist theorists have criticized it sharply
for advocating policies that essentially require women to live and
work under laws designed by and for men. For instance, formal
equality in the workplace would require men and women to work
the same hours to achieve the same level of success, despite the
fact that women often undertake childbearing and childrearing
responsibilities in the home. 9 Under the formal equality theory,
therefore, women could only achieve "equality" in a workplace
that is designed around the model of a single earner family, a
model that neither recognizes women's work in the home nor
gives men the flexibility to share in this labor. Formal equality,
therefore, arguably fails to take account of women's unique circumstances, unintentionally sanctions oppressive relationships,
and ultimately prevents women from achieving true economic,
political, and social equality.
Initially, McCaffery's use of the optimal tax theory seems to
satisfy this alternative branch of feminism, often called "dominance feminism." The optimal tax theory allows, indeed man-

'This does not mean that formal equality theorists would object to any proposal that
lowers women's tax burdens. As McCaffery points out, married women currently suffer a
greater tax burden than any other group due to the existence of the joint filing returns.
This implies that formal equality theorists would support a policy of independent filing
that would ensure that men and women are subject to identical tax rates at identical income levels. See, for example, Pamela B. Gann, Abandoning MaritalStatus as a Factorin
Allocating Income Tax Burdens, 59 Tex L Rev 1, 32 (1980) (advocating the repeal of the
joint return provisions). Efficiency theorists, on the other hand, would propose going
much further than simply imposing identical tax burdens on men and women, given the
fact that married women are more responsive to the wage rate. See, for example, Rosen,
PublicFinanceat 332 (cited in note 18) (noting that neutral taxation is not efficient).
"See Abrams, 92 Mich L Rev at 2480 (cited in note 36) (noting that "difference"
feminists view discrimination as a failure to account for gender differences); Sara Ruddick, MaternalThinking 42-44 (Beacon 1989) (discussing the historically different roles of
mothers and fathers).

The University of ChicagoLaw Review

[65:653

dates, that Congress tailor legal reform to accommodate the differences in men's and women's labor supply elasticity, which in
turn may be traced to the biological, psychological, and structural
features that are unique to women's lives." Thus, rather than
sanctioning the hierarchical relationships that currently exist,
optimal tax theory has the potential to equalize them. Yet when
McCaffery's argument is carefully examined, he is subject to the
very criticisms leveled against the formal equality theorists. He
fails to acknowledge that tax incentives do not eliminate the difficulties women face in entering the market. Employers, for example, have long resisted women's entry and advancement in the
market given their assumption that women are uncommitted to
waged labor. Moreover, even without these roadblocks women
may be unable to work in light of their childbearing and childrearing responsibilities.
Although McCaffery argues that his proposal is intended
simply to offset the existing biases that working women suffer
(i.e., to make the tax code truly neutral with regard to women's
work in the home and in the market), the book reads as if McCaffery believes women's choice to work in the home is a function of
bad judgment or false consciousness. Indeed, he seems to ridicule
legislators and women who suggest that mothers are forced into
the workplace for economic reasons despite their true desire to
stay home. McCaffery implies that such arguments are merely
clever rhetoric used to further oppress women in society (p 210)."'
McCaffery argues, for example, that in promoting traditional
family values, The Contract with America is "nothing more than

a nightmare of patriarchy for many Amerian women-a nightmare from which they cannot awake" (p 206). While this view
does not detract from the important point that women suffer material costs when they perform unpaid labor in the home, it has
distinct disadvantages from a third feminist viewpoint that seeks
to acknowledge and value a caregiver's role in society.42
Throughout the book, McCaffery suggests that housework is
marginalizing and oppressive while market labor is the only
means for women to achieve economic independence and social
See Staudt, 84 Georgetown L J at 1581-85 (cited in note 3) (discussing the various
underlying reasons for women's movement in and out of the workplace).
"' That McCaffery's proposal is designed only for its behavioral effects on women's aggregate labor supply also is suggested by the fact that only married women who currently
work in the home would be entitled to the tax reduction. If McCaffery were willing to allow all married women, not just those with elastic supply curves, to gain the benefit of
the reduction, his proposal would be sure to lose the support of the economists.
' See, for example, Robin West, Jurisprudenceand Gender, 55 U Chi L Rev 1, 13-24
(1988) (discussing the work of cultural feminists).
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status (p 22). He fails to acknowledge, however, that economic
vulnerability stems in large part from the fact that our society
values market labor, but not unpaid domestic labor. Rather than
proposing to value the work women traditionally do, McCaffery
seeks to assimilate women into the market, the traditionally
male sphere often perceived to be biased and unfriendly toward
women. This type of reform perpetuates the notion that atomistic, market-oriented roles are more valuable to society than caring, nurturing, and relational roles-a view that is not universally shared.' Moreover, the idea of pushing women into the
workplace-along with reforms McCaffery has proposed elsewhere, such as the repeal of Title VII on the grounds that it has
deleterious long-term effects on women--will spark extensive
criticism from feminists who are convinced that women suffer
unfair biases in the workplace.
Despite its disadvantages, it might appear that McCaffery's
proposal has the distinct advantage of encouraging men to undertake greater levels of household labor. If women move into the
market, they share the responsibility of earning a wage, thereby
potentially freeing men to perform a greater level of household
labor. In fact, however, this role reversal does not take place. Sociological data indicate that women do not substitute market
work for household responsibilities.45 Instead, women continue to
be responsible for the bulk of the household labor even after
moving into the waged labor force. As a result, focusing only
upon women's market labor might increase the burden on women
by encouraging women to work full-time in the waged labor market and full-time in the home. While this observation does not
dissolve McCaffery's claim for lower marginal rates on married
women, it suggests that the utility gains from his proposal will
be offset by the utility losses that women incur due to the "double
work load" that they are likely to suffer following a move into the
waged labor market.
This discussion of McCaffery's work suggests that legal reformers generally and tax scholars in particular have ignored an
I See Staudt, 84 Georgetown L J at 1616 (cited in note 3). For an excellent discussion
of this problem throughout the law, see Katharine Silbaugh, Turning Labor Into Love:
Housework and the Law, 91 Nw U L Rev 1 (1996).
" See Edward J. McCaffery, Slouching Toward Equality: Gender Discrimination,
Market Efficiency, and Social Change, 103 Yale L J 595, 664-65 (1993) (advocating the repeal ofregulatory provisions requiring equal pay).
See Shelton, Women, Men and Time at 65-66 (cited in note 7) (noting the disparities
in men's and women's labor time). See also Silbaugh, 91 Nw U L Rev at 8-17 (cited in
note 43) (discussing the phenomenon); Staudt, 84 Georgetown L J at 1579-81 (cited in
note 3) (same).
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important factor contributing to women's social, economic, and
political marginalization. In a liberal society it is, of course, important for women to have the option to move into the labor market. Yet such an opportunity may not be possible under any variant of feminist theory given the fact that the theorists do not address a central problem associated with the gendered division of
labor. Formal equality feminism calls for equal treatment in the
marketplace, dominance feminism calls for legal rules that recognize women's unique circumstances, and cultural feminism
calls for society to value women's caretaking role in the home.
None of the theories, however, provide a strategy for encouraging
(or enabling) men to undertake a greater share of the household
chores. Until this is accomplished, both men's and women's
choices will be seriously circumscribed by the powerful social
norms that place men in the market and women in the home. Put
differently, men and women may be temporarily able to transgress their traditional gendered roles, but in doing so they will
suffer heavy costs that will, in turn, push them back into traditional roles.
C.

Disagreement Between Feminists and Economists

The disagreements among feminists about the values underlying McCaffery's optimal tax system may translate into a
further dispute with economists over empirical questions. In devising a rate schedule that assures the desired behavioral effect,
Congress must determine the precise elasticity of married
women's labor supply curves. Econometric studies, however, have
produced a wide range of predictions with regard to women's labor supply elasticity. As McCaffery notes, the estimates have
ranged from zero to well over one (pp 180-83),"s thereby predicting that women will either fail to respond to the rate change or
be quite responsive. This discrepancy, of course, poses difficult
problems for tax policymakers who must choose between the conflicting estimates. Choosing a number that overestimates
women's elasticity, on the one hand, will produce a rate schedule
that fails to accomplish McCaffery's behavioral goals.' On the
other hand, choosing an elasticity number that underestimates
See also Bankman and Griffith, 75 Cal L Rev at 1922-23 & nn 67-69, 72 (cited in
note 25) (describing various approaches for estimating the elasticity of waged labor and
citing to over thirty different studies).
17 See Alstott, 96 Colum L Rev at 2020 (cited in note 4). Alstott
also points out that
even if women respond to the changes in the tax structure, it is difficult to predict the
manner in which they will respond. Id at 2036 (noting that different proposals encouraging market work will have different effects).
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women's elasticity will encourage Congress to decrease significantly the rates on married women while increasing the rates on
men and single women to make the policy revenue neutral. Yet
the difference in projected revenue and actual revenue could be
huge if the latter group is priced out of the waged labor market
due to the tax increase."
Moreover, the policy choice will be complicated by the fact
that theorists might seek to use the econometric studies that best
advance their underlying theory of fairness and gender justice.
Although the manner in which feminist and economic theorists
will align themselves in tax policy debates is difficult, if not impossible, to predict, it is easy to imagine certain coalitions. Those
who seek to avoid giving a tax reduction to women, for example,
are likely to defer to econometric studies suggesting that women
are highly responsive to changes in the wage rate. This is true
because the more women are responsive to the tax rates, the less
Congress must reduce the tax burden to achieve its behavioral
goal. Economists who argue that women's choices are highly responsive (or distorted) by taxation can be called "elasticity pessimists," given the fact that distortion leads to overall welfare
losses.49 At the same time, theorists who seek to afford women
preferential treatment are likely to defer to studies suggesting
that women's choices are not highly distorted by changes in the
tax code. In other words, these theorists would argue that Congress could only achieve its goal of encouraging women into the
market with a significant tax reduction. Economists finding the
latter might be called "elasticity optimists.""0
It is easy to see that a large collection of feminists will be
elasticity pessimists. Formal equality feminists will argue
women should be subject to identical tax rates rather than lower
rates than men. Feminists who seek legal reform reflecting the
value of household labor also will object to tax reform that appears to value market labor over unpaid labor in the home. Yet
dominance feminists will most likely support the elasticity opti,' See John D. Jackson and Richard P. Saba, Some Limits on Taxing Sin: Cigarette
Taxation and Health Care Finance, 63 S Econ J 761, 762-64 (1997) (noting that economists dispute the level to which Congress can raise taxes on cigarettes before reaching
the point at which smokers will be priced out of the market).
, Stiglitz, Economics of the PublicSector at 481 (cited in note 29).
Id. A similar problem is found in the economists' debate over progressivity. Theorists who support progressive taxation tend to argue that the cost of reducing inequality
is smaller than the costs perceived by those who argue against progressivity. This inconsistency occurs due to the underlying disagreements about the data reflecting the elasticities of individual behavior. Those who believe that welfare losses are small are "elasticity optimists" while those who believe that distortions caused by taxation are large are
often referred to as "elasticity pessimists." Id.
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mists. Indeed, given the wide range of predictions with regard to
women's elasticity, even McCaffery may support the elasticity
optimists to ensure his market-oriented behavioral goals are
achieved." In short, until economists reach consensus on the precise elasticity of women's labor, there is room for significant disagreement among various strands of feminism, each group
pointing to econometric studies supporting the underlying values
it seeks to promote.
Therefore, McCaffery's suggestion that both feminists and
economists will support the use of optimal tax theory is overstated. Economists themselves have not reached agreement on
the fairness debate implicated by use of the theory. Moreover,
feminist theorists are unlikely to universally support tax reform
that awards a tax break to married women in order to encourage
them into the market. In short, the most that can be said about
McCaffery's proposal is that some economists and some feminists
will support it.
The next Part turns to the implementation problems that
exist with or without the successful coalition of feminists and
economists.
III. THE POLITICS OF REFORM

Even if McCaffery's proposal were to garner the universal
support of feminists and economists, the political problems associated with implementation would be difficult, if not impossible,
to overcome. In failing to discuss these problems, McCaffery implies that upon discovering the inequities and inefficiencies contained in the existing tax code, Congress immediately will seek to
remedy these flaws. 2 McCaffery's view reflects the public interest theory of politics-a view of political decisionmaking that assumes legislators are altruistic and public-spirited enough to advocate and support legislation that (arguably) advances the interests of society as a whole.5"
McCaffery, of course, is not alone in recognizing that the
government can, in theory, play a role in promoting market effi51 See Alstott, 96 Colum L Rev at 2033-42 (cited in note 4) (exploring McCaffery's
market-oriented claims in particular); Staudt, 84 Georgetown L J at 1572-73, 1599-1618
(cited in note 3) (exploring and critiquing the market-oriented feminist scholars).
' McCaffery does, however, puzzle over the fact that politicians follow efficiency
norms in some situations, but often do not in situations in which following the norms
would advance the interests of women (pp 177, 190, 193, 202, 215, 225).
' For an excellent discussion of this view, see Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice
and PublicInterest: A Study of the Legislative Processas Illustratedby Tax Legislation in
the 1980s, 139 U Pa L Rev 1, 31-64 (1990). See also Nancy C. Staudt, FiscalConstitutionalism 13 (unpublished manuscript on file with U Chi L Rev).
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ciency as well as social justice. Indeed, economists since the
framing of the Constitution have proposed using the government
as a means of ensuring the growth and stability of the market
economy, and a number of theorists have sought to use the tax
code as a means of promoting distributional justice. Yet the
school of thought that assumes government actors are willing
and able to rise above their own self-interest for the interest of
the public at large has been sharply criticized. Critics of the public interest theory argue that the realities of the existing political
institutions make it almost impossible to implement a policy that
would maximize social welfare under any theory of fairness or efficiency. While these critics come from many directions, I will focus specifically on the problems associated with two schools of
thought: the special interest theory of politics and the expressive
theory of politics.
Likely to be the major skeptics of McCaffery's public interest
assumption are the public choice theorists, who argue that the
legislative process works much like the private market, where
special interest groups and voters form the demand side and the
legislature forms the supply side." Although there are many
branches of and insights to public choice theory, its major implication is that "legislation transfers wealth from society as a
whole to discrete, well-organized groups that enjoy superior access to the political process and that government will enact laws
that reduce societal wealth and economic efficiency in order to
benefit these economic groups."5 Collective action problems explain why the wealth transfers tend to be enjoyed by narrow special interest groups, as the public choice theorists predict. Congressional members have an incentive to award narrow tax benefits as a means of obtaining contributions because the contributions, in turn, work to ensure their reelection. At the same time,
the public at large is unable to monitor the political system and
thus is unable to identify inefficient transfers that the public
funds through higher taxes. Indeed, rational individuals will
have little incentive to inform themselves about the nature of tax
legislation given the fact that the personal cost of such legislation
is often lower than the cost of acquiring the information about its
inequalities and inefficiencies. Moreover, even if the costs of acquiring information about tax legislation were relatively low
See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics without Romance: Implication of Public
Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation,74 Va L Rev 275, 285 (1988) (providing a thorough explanation of public choice theorists' views on the market for legislation).
' Jonathan R. Macey, PromotingPublic-RegardingLegislation Through Statutory Interpretation:AnInterest Group Model, 86 Colum L Rev 223, 230 (1986).
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compared to the costs of the laws' effects, the price of organizing
an effective political coalition to oppose the policy is often so high
that expending the resources necessary to understand the economic effects of the law remains irrational."
McCaffery might argue that the political struggles around
the family tax rules do not conform to the special interest theory
of politics. Although he provides an account of a political struggle
in which men systematically win while working women invariably lose, there is no evidence that men have organized into a
powerful special interest group. Indeed, millions of working men
hardly can be characterized as a well-organized interest group,
successfully lobbying Congress for tax benefits. Unlike the typical narrow, self-interested group seeking narrowly tailored legislation, men on the whole appear to be just as diffuse and unorganized as the public at large.
At the same time, however, Taxing Women suggests that
men as a whole have not benefited from the family tax rules. Instead, the beneficiaries have been a fairly narrow sector of this
group, principally working men with stay-at-home spouses.
Moreover, as McCaffery points out, this group of elite men has
participated in the political process, successfully advancing their
own interests, as evidenced by the storm of protest over the 1941
joint return proposal (p 50)."7 But even here, this group does not
function in the manner that interest group theory would predict.
Rather than making monetary contributions for legislation that
advances their interest, McCaffery's work indicates that this
group expressed its disapproval of the 1941 proposal and won
support for the 1948 proposal largely through writing newspaper
articles and editorial pieces (p 50). While Congress does not ignore this form of political action, special interest theory holds
that it is campaign contributions that most effectively capture
legislators' attention. Thus, special interest theory cannot explain fully the development of the family tax rules. To understand the story that McCaffery recounts as well as the problems
that his reform proposal will face, we must look to the literature
exploring the expressive function and symbolic manipulation of
politics.

See Michael A. Fitts, Can Ignorance Be Bliss? Imperfect Information as a Positive
Influence in PoliticalInstitutions, 88 Mich L Rev 917, 926-28 (1990) (noting that it is often irrational for the unorganized and diffuse public to spend time and energy uncovering
the economic effects of legislation); Jonathan I. Macey, Competing Economic Views of the
Constitution, 56 Geo Wash L Rev 50, 77 (1987) (arguing that, as a general matter, citizens have little incentive to inform themselves of the costs of ordinary statutes).
' See notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
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Daniel Shaviro has provided the best explanation in the legal
literature of the symbolic manipulation of tax politics. He notes
that legislators' goal of reelection leads them not only to cultivate
well-organized special interest groups, but also to propose and
adopt legislation that has symbolic meaning to the general public.5" Under this view, legislators are less interested in the substance of proposed legislation or its actual impact on society;
rather, they are focused on how the legislation will affect their
reputations and chances for reelection. 9 Voters, who are rationally ignorant about the substance of proposed legal reform, often
are swayed by the emotional and symbolic message contained in
legislation. The important implication of the theory of symbolic
politics is that the public is willing to accept legal rules and policies that appear to decrease aggregate welfare if the law expresses a certain ideological and moral viewpoint.' In short, the
expressive function of the law is often more important than the
economic benefits associated with it.
The problem with implementing McCaffery's proposal, therefore, lies with the fact that legislators and voters often act in an
economically irrational manner. Despite the potential welfare
gains available to society through the use of optimal tax theory,
Congress and the public at large might resist McCaffery's proposed reform in light of its expressive content. As McCaffery
notes throughout the book, theorists and policymakers have used
the federal income tax system as a symbol of the morality associated with traditional family values. Tax benefits for traditional
married couples, it is argued, ensure that this particular family
structure survives and flourishes, thereby advancing the interests of society in general. Stanley Surrey, for example, noted that
the 1948 joint retuin provisions alleviated women of their onerous business responsibilities, enabling them to return to the noble and loving "pursuit of homemaking" (p 57).61 The Social SecuShaviro, 139 U Pa L Rev at 7-8 (cited in note 53); Daniel Shaviro, Do Deficits Matter?274-78 (Chicago 1997).
' See Shaviro, 139 U Pa L Rev at 83-86 (cited in note 53) (analyzing the benefits--beyond its policy goals--of making legislation).
See id at 77-80 (noting voters' willingness to forego self-interest and vote along
symbolic lines). See also Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U Pa
L Rev 2021 (1996) (discussing the effect of law on social meaning); Dan M. Kahan, What
Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U Chi L Rev 591 (1996) (exploring the symbolic
meaning of punishment); Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U Chi L
Rev 943 (1995) (exploring the expressive function of law generally); Richard H. Pildes,
The Unintended Cultural Consequences of Public Policy, 89 Mich L Rev 936 (1991) (analyzing the effect of public policy on social understandings).
"1See Stanley S. Surrey, Federal Taxation of the Family-The Revenue Act of 1948,
61 Harv L Rev 1097, 1111 (1948).
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rity and fringe benefit provisions also enable women to enjoy
work-related benefits without engaging in the market work that
is assumed to cause the deterioration of the modern male-headed
nuclear family (pp 89-136). Similarly, the nontaxation of imputed
income is widely accepted as giving caretakers a "tax benefit" for
the valued services they provide to the home (pp 120-22). That
policymakers continue to use the tax code as a means of expressing reverence for women's household labor is evident in The
Contract with America, which suggests that through child credits
a woman will be able to provide better care for her home and her
family, thereby saving the marriage and protecting her children
from the consumerist culture that values "Nintendos and Nikes"
rather than basic family structures (p 208).
Within this cultural landscape, McCaffery's proposal to provide women with incentives to substitute market work for
household labor is likely to be viewed as anti-family tax relief.
Indeed, even if politicians recognize the value of women's market
labor to the overall economy, it could be professional suicide to
advocate a policy that goes so far as to reduce the tax rate on
women below that imposed upon men. Most Americans believe
that women's work is not only discretionary but that given the
scarcity of jobs and the importance of family, women have a duty
not to work (pp 22, 77). A tax law that provided incentives for
women to work in the waged labor force would be viewed widely
with suspicion and contempt. As Representative Pete Stark has
acknowledged, congressional representatives will "do whatever is
politically popular" rather than economically sound (p 77).62
Of course, a skilled political entrepreneur might cast McCaffery's proposal in a manner that expresses a social meaning acceptable to the public at large. For example, McCaffery specifically focuses on the burden that married women suffer and thus
his proposal might be characterized as "pro-marriage" tax reform. The recent attention given to the so-called "marriage penalty" and the bipartisan support for its elimination suggest that
this maneuver could be politically successful.
The marriage penalty is the added burden that working couples suffer upon getting married. Reform proposals intended to
address the marriage penalty give tax benefits to dual earner
couples, thereby operating as an incentive to both men's and
women's market labor. Yet, as the label suggests, the reform is

"Tax Treatment of Married, Head of Household, and Single Taxpayers, Hearings before the Committee on Ways and Means, 96th Cong, 2d Sess 218 (1980) (remarks of Representative Pete Stark).
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widely viewed as an incentive to marriage, not to market work.
Similarly, McCaffery's proposal might gain support if characterized as "pro-marriage" tax reform rather than reform that promotes economic efficiency and gender justice. Although this label
misses the nuance of McCaffery's analysis, the public generally is
less interested in the technical details of tax reform or the precise nature of the problem to be remedied. What is important is
the perceived social meaning of the legislation; the public responds to political symbols.
Political rhetoric, however, does not eliminate the possibility
that the details of McCaffery's tax reform proposal will be revealed. In an effort to incite opposition, opponents of the proposal
are likely to highlight the fact that McCaffery hopes to reduce
the rate on married women to below that of single men and
women. This implies that he believes married women should be
in the labor market, a view that is not universally shared. Indeed, working women are often viewed as a threat to the survival
of the family." Thus, even if the public is swayed initially, popular opinion could quickly change with enormous negative repercussions for the legislators who support the proposed reform."
Understanding this threat, cautious legislators who believe the
public can and will be incited against the proposed legislation
will adjust their position on the issue to correspond more directly
with public opinion over the long run."
Moreover, if, as in the past, the small group of elite men with
stay-at-home spouses object to McCaffery's proposed reform, the
proposal is likely to meet defeat. Murray Edelman's classic text,
The Symbolic Uses of Politics, demonstrates how the public's
taste for abstract symbols can further the interest of narrow interest groups.66 Edelman argues that while the general public is
captivated and enthralled by the emotional content of the symbol, the smaller, organized groups keep an eye on the substance
of legislation. Indeed, the latter assist in the manipulation of
symbols in order to win the widespread support for policies and
programs that favor their own material interests." This theory
predicts the pattern that McCaffery discovers in Taxing Women.
While the traditional single earner families endlessly win tax
See, for example, p 166 (noting the controversial nature of his proposal and the

number of people who have commented to him that "traditional families with stay-athome wives [are] good for society, for children, for men, even for women).
See R. Douglas Arnold, The Logic of CongressionalAction 68 (Yale 1990).
See id at 70.
Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics22-27 (Illinois 1964).
Id at 36-40. See also Shaviro, 139 U Pa L Rev at 48 (cited in note 53) (discussing
Edelman's work in the tax context).
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benefits, dual earning couples (and working wives in particular)
suffer the costs. Symbolic politics, therefore, tends to produce
legislation that harms the economic interests of the very groups
that support it-a point that McCaffery implies throughout the
book with regard to women's decisions to work in the home."
Of course, the legal reform McCaffery proposes could be
worthwhile precisely because of the message it conveys about the
outdated social norms that have been codified in the tax laws.
Indeed, legal reform might be necessary to change the norms
given the collective action problem associated with changing social mores in the private market context. A number of structural
barriers continue to exist in the market due to employers' assumption that women are uncommitted to waged work given
their desire to work in the home and to care for children. 9 These
obstacles, in turn, may cause women to lower their aspiration
and commitment to the waged labor force, thereby reinforcing
the very stereotype that made it impossible to achieve success in
the first place.70 Women, of course, are powerless to solve this
problem alone, and employers will not be easily convinced that
women are willing to abandon work in the home for market labor
(pp 242-43). Accordingly, legal reform that not only symbolizes
the importance of women's work, but also makes that work possible, is particularly important for changing social norms.71
The problem is that Congress will resist adopting legislation
that works to change the norm given the existence of the norm
itself. Legislators, endlessly worried about reelection, are far
more likely to adopt legislation that reinforces the norm than
legislation that challenges it. In short, the symbolic use of the tax
law implies that there are serious limits to the type of legal reform suggested by McCaffery and other liberal legal reformers.
McCaffery's argument clearly identifies the fairness and efficiency problems associated with the existing tax structure. But
he ignores the deeply entrenched views that have legitimated the
As Daniel Shaviro notes, however, if people want the legislation they get, then it is
questionable to say they are harmed by it. Their economic interests may certainly be
harmed, but the utility losses from such costs may be lower than the utility gains from
the expressive content of the law. Shaviro, 139 U Pa L Rev at 48-49 (cited in note 53).
See Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: JudicialInterpretations
of Sex Segregationin the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of InterestArgument, 103 Harv L Rev 1750, 1814-16 (1990) (noting the need to analyze the role that organizational structure plays in shaping work preferences).
" See Rosabeth Moss Kanter, The Impact of HierarchicalStructures on the Work Behavior of Women and Men, in Rachel Kahn-Hut, Arlene Kaplan Daniels, and Richard
Colvard, eds, Women and Work: Problemsand Perspectives 234, 235 (Oxford 1982).
" See Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 Colum L Rev 903, 923
(1996) (exploring the way in which law can help to constitute and redefine roles).
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system in the first place. Legislators and society in general seem
largely uninterested in the possibility of equalizing the market
options between men and women. Indeed, the evidence suggests
just the opposite.
CONCLUSION

Taxing Women provides a detailed and nuanced account of
the gendered nature of tax policy. In exploring this bias, Edward
McCaffery argues that Congress can simultaneously promote
gender justice and economic efficiency through the reduction of
married women's federal tax rates. Although many view this as
an argument for providing an unfair economic advantage to
women, McCaffery powerfully argues that maintaining the
status quo simply enables men to reap the benefits of a windfall
they were given decades ago (p 271). While McCaffery's work is
ingenious in a number of ways, many economic and feminist
theorists will object to his proposal. Moreover, he fails to recognize the importance of ideology, morality, and social norms in the
context of political reform. Ignoring the expressive content and
the symbolic manipulation of the law disregards a key factor in
achieving political change generally and tax reform in particular.
Accordingly, McCaffery's book suggests that feminists, economists, and tax policy theorists must move beyond the task of
identifying tax injustices and economic inefficiencies to a research agenda that explores the difficulties of implementing political change in a society that resists it.

